Abstract. Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been proposed as a framework for proof-carrying code (PCC) in which the code supplier provides a program together with an abstraction (or abstract model of the program) whose validity entails compliance with a predefined safety policy. The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certificate and its generation (and validation) is carried out automatically by a fixed-point analyzer. Existing approaches for PCC are developed under the assumption that the consumer reads and validates the entire program w.r.t. the full certificate at once, in a non incremental way. In the context of ACC, we propose an incremental approach to PCC for the generation of certificates and the checking of untrusted updates of a (trusted) program, i.e., when a producer provides a modified version of a previously validated program. By update, we refer to any arbitrary change on a program, i.e., the extension of the program with new procedures, the deletion of existing procedures and the replacement of existing procedures by new versions for them. Our proposal is that, if the consumer keeps the original (fixed-point) abstraction, it is possible to provide only the program updates and the incremental certificate (i.e., the difference of abstractions). The first obvious advantage is that the size of the transmitted certificate can be considerably reduced. Furthermore, it is now possible to define an incremental checking algorithm which, given the new updates and its incremental certificate, only re-checks the fixpoint for each procedure affected by the updates and the propagation of the effect of these fixpoint changes. As a consequence, both certificate transmission time and checking time can be reduced significantly. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first incremental approach to PCC.
Introduction
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [12] is a general technique for mobile code safety which proposes to associate safety information in the form of a certificate to programs. The certificate (or proof) is created at compile time by the certifier on the code supplier side, and it is packaged along with the code. The consumer who receives or downloads the (untrusted) code+certificate package can then run a checker which by an efficient inspection of the code and the certificate can verify the validity of the certificate and thus compliance with the safety policy. The key benefit of this "certificate-based" approach to mobile code safety is that the consumer's task is reduced from the level of proving to the level of checking, a task which should be much simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating the original certificate.
Abstraction-carrying code (ACC) [3] has been recently proposed as an enabling technology for PCC in which an abstraction (i.e., an abstract model of the program) plays the role of certificate. An important feature of ACC is that not only the checking, but also the generation of the abstraction (or fixpoint) is automatically carried out by a fixed-point analyzer. Lightweight bytecode verification [14] is another PCC method which relies on analysis techniques (namely on type analyses in the style of those used for Java bytecode verification [9] ) to generate and check certificates in the context of the Java Card language. In this paper, we will consider analyzers which construct a program analysis graph which is interpreted as an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of states explored by the concrete execution. Essentially, the certification/analysis carried out by the supplier is an iterative process which repeatedly traverses the analysis graph until a fixpoint is reached. A key idea in ACC is that, since the certificate is a fixpoint, a single pass over the analysis graph is sufficient to validate the certificate in the consumer side.
Existing models for PCC (ACC among them) are based on checkers which receive a "certificate+program" package and read and validate the entire program w.r.t. its certificate at once, in a non incremental way. However, there are situations which are not well suited to this simple model and which instead require only rechecking certain parts of the analysis graph which has already been validated. In particular, we consider possible untrusted updates of a validated (trusted) code, i.e., a code producer can (periodically) send to its consumers new updates of a previously submitted package. By updates, we mean any modification over a program including: 1) the addition of new data/procedures and the extension of already existing procedures with new functionalities, 2) the deletion of procedures or parts of them and 3) the replacement of certain (parts of) procedures by new versions for them. In such a context of frequent software updates, it appears inefficient to submit a full certificate (superseding the original one) and to perform the checking of the entire updated program from scratch, as needs to be done with current systems. In the context of ACC, we investigate an incremental approach to PCC, both for the certificate generation as well as for the checking process.
Regarding the first issue, when a program is updated, a new fixpoint has to be computed for the updated program. Such fixpoint differs from the original fixpoint stored in the certificate in a) the new fixpoint for each procedure affected by the changes and b) the update of certain (existing) fixpoints affected by the propagation of the effect of a). However, certain parts of the original certificate may not have affected by the changes. Our proposal is that, if the consumer still keeps the original abstraction, it is possible to provide, along with the program updates, only the difference of both abstractions, i.e., the incremental certificate. Essentially, the incremental certificate will contain the subset of the new fixpoint which is different from the original fixpoint. The first obvious advantage of our incremental approach is that the size of the certificate may be substantially reduced by submitting only the increment.
The second issue in incremental PCC is that the task performed by the checker can also be further reduced. In principle, a non-incremental checker (like the one in [3] ) requires a whole traversal of the analysis graph where the entire program + updates is checked against the (full) certificate. However, it is now possible to define an incremental checking algorithm which, given the updates and its incremental certificate, only rechecks the part of the analysis graph for the procedures which have been affected by the updates and, also, propagates and rechecks the effect of these changes. In order to perform such propagation of changes, the dependencies between the nodes of the original analysis graph have to be stored by the consumers, together with the original certificate. With this, the checking process is carried out in a single pass over the part of the abstraction affected by the updates. Thus, the second advantage of our incremental approach is that checking time is further reduced. We believe that our incremental approach contributes to the practical uptake of PCC systems since it can significantly reduce certificate size and checking time in the context of program updates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces briefly some notation and preliminary notions on abstract interpretation and ACC. In Section 3, we present an overview of incremental ACC. Section 4 recalls the notion of full certificate and Section 5 introduces the concepts of incremental certificate and incremental certifier. In Section 6, we instrument a non incremental checking algorithm with dependencies in order to support incrementally. In Section 7, we present an incremental abstract interpretation-based checker. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Abstraction-Carrying Code
We assume some familiarity with abstract interpretation (see [6] ), (Constraint) Logic Programming (C)LP (see, e.g., [11, 10] ) and PCC [12] .
An abstract interpretation-based certifier is a function Certifier: Prog×ADom× AInt → ACert which for a given program P ∈ Prog, an abstract domain D α ∈ ADom and an abstract safety policy I α ∈ AInt generates an abstract certificate Cert α ∈ ACert, by using an abstract interpreter for D α , which entails that P satisfies I α . In the following, we denote that I α and Cert α are specifications given as abstract semantic values of D α by using the same subscript α.
The basics for defining such certifiers (and their corresponding checkers) in ACC are summarized in the following five points:
and its corresponding concrete domain 2 D , ⊆ , both with a complete lattice structure. Abstract values and sets of concrete values are related by an abstraction function α : 2 D → D α , and a concretization function γ : D α → 2
D . An abstract value y ∈ D α is a safe approximation of a concrete value x ∈ D iff x ∈ γ(y). The concrete and abstract domains must be related in such a way that the following holds [6] ∀x ∈ 2 D : γ(α(x)) ⊇ x and ∀y ∈ D α : α(γ(y)) = y. In general is induced by ⊆ and α. Similarly, the operations of least upper bound ( ) and greatest lower bound ( ) mimic those of 2 D in a precise sense.
Analysis. We consider the class of fixed-point semantics in which a (monotonic) semantic operator, S P , is associated to each program P . The meaning of the program, [[P ] ], is defined as the least fixed point of the S P operator, i.e., [[P ]] = lfp(S P ). If S P is continuous, the least fixed point is the limit of an iterative process involving at most ω applications of S P starting from the bottom element of the lattice. Using abstract interpretation, we can usually only compute [ 
Together, Equations (1) Checking. A checker is a function Checker: Prog × ADom × ACert → bool which for a program P ∈ Prog, an abstract domain D α ∈ ADom and certificate Cert α ∈ ACert checks whether Cert α is a fixpoint of S α P or not:
Verification Condition Regeneration. To retain the safety guarantees, the consumer must regenerate a trustworthy verification condition -Equation (2)-and use the incoming certificate to test for adherence of the safety policy.
P is trusted iff Cert
A fundamental idea in ACC is that, while analysis -Equation (1)-is an iterative process, checking -Equation (3)-is guaranteed to be done in a single pass over the abstraction. Figure 1 presents an overview of incremental ACC. On the left side, the producer starts from an Updated Program, U P , w.r.t. a previously certified Program, P . It first retrieves from disk P and its certificate, Cert, computed in the previous certification phase. Next, the process " " compares both programs and returns the differences between them, Upd (P ), i.e, the program Updates which applied to P result in U P , written as Upd (P ) = U P P . Note that, from an implementation perspective, a program update should contain both the new updates to be applied to the program and instructions on where to place and remove such new code. This can be easily done by using the traditional Unix diff format for coding program updates. An Incremental Certifier generates from Cert, P and Upd (P ) an incremental certificate, Inc Cert, which can be used by the consumer to validate the new updates. The package "Upd (P )+Inc Cert" is submitted to the code consumer. Finally, in order to have a compositional incremental approach, the producer has to update the original certificate and program with the new updates. Thus, the resulting Ext Cert and U P are stored in disk replacing Cert and P , respectively.
On the right side of the figure, the consumer receives the untrusted package. In order to validate the incoming update w.r.t. the provided (incremental) certificate, it first retrieves from disk P and Cert. Next, it reconstructs the updated program by using an operator "⊕" which applies the update to P and generates U P = P ⊕Upd (P ). This can implemented by using a program in the spirit of the traditional Unix patch command as ⊕ operator. An Incremental Checker now efficiently validates the new modification by using the stored data and the incoming incremental certificate. If the validation succeeds (returns ok), the checker will have reconstructed the full certificate. As before, the updated program and extended certificate are stored in disk (superseding the previous versions) for future (incremental) updates. In order to simplify our scheme, we assume that the safety policy and the generation of the verification condition [12] are embedded within the certifier and checker. However, in an incremental approach, producer and consumer could perfectly agree on a new safety policy to be implied by the modification. It should be noted that this does not affect our incremental approach and the verification condition would be generated exactly as in non incremental PCC.
Let us now characterize the types of updates we consider and how they can be dealt within the ACC scheme. Given a program P , we define an update of P , written as Upd (P ), as a set of tuples of the form A, Add (A), Del (A) , where A = p(x 1 , . . . , x n ) is an atom in base form, and:
-Add (A) is the set of rules which are to be added to P for predicate p. This includes both the case of addition of new procedures, when p did not exist in P , as well as the extension of additional rules (or functionality) for p, if it existed. -Del (A) is the set of rules which are to be removed from P for predicate p.
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, we do not include the instructions on where to place and remove such code in the formalization of our method. We distinguish three classes of updates: the addition of procedures occurs when ∀A, Del (A) = ∅, the deletion of procedures occurs if ∀A, Add (A) = ∅ and the remaining cases are considered arbitrary changes.
Addition of Procedures. When a program P is extended with new procedures or new clauses for existing procedures, the original certificate Cert α is not guaranteed to be a correct fixpoint any longer, because the contribution of the new rules can lead to a more general answer. Consider P add the program after applying some additions and Cert add α the certificate computed from scratch for P add . Then, Cert α Cert add α . This means that Cert α is no longer valid in order to entail safety. Therefore, we need to lub the contribution of the new rules and submit, together with the extension, the new certificate Cert add α (or the difference of both certificates). The consumer will thus test the safety policy w.r.t. Cert add α . Deletion of Procedures. The first thing to note is that in order to entail the safety policy, unlike extensions over the program, we need not change the certificate at all when some procedures are deleted. Consider P del the program after applying some deletions and Cert del α the certificate computed from scratch for P del . The original certificate Cert α is trivially guaranteed to be a correct fixpoint (hence a correct certificate), because the contribution of the rules were lubbed to give Cert α and so it still correctly describes the contribution of each remaining rule. By applying Equation 2, Cert α is still valid for P del w.r.t. I α since Cert α I α . Therefore, more accuracy is not needed to ensure compliance with the safety policy. This suggests that the incremental certificate can be empty and the checking process does not have to check any procedure. However, it can happen that a new, more precise, safety policy is agreed by the consumer and producer. Also, this accuracy could be required in a later modification. Although Cert α is a correct certificate, it is possibly less accurate than Cert Arbitrary Changes. The case of arbitrary changes considers that rules can both be deleted from and added to an already validated program. In this case, the new certificate for the modified program can be either equal, more or less precise than the original one, or even not comparable. Imagine that an arbitrary change replaces a rule R a , which contributes to a fixpoint Cert 
The Full Certificate
Although ACC and Incremental ACC, as overviewed above, are general proposals not tied to any particular programming paradigm, our developments for incremental ACC (as well as for the original ACC framework [3] ) are formalized in the context of (C)LP. Very briefly, a constraint is essentially a conjunction of expressions built from predefined predicates (such as term equations or inequalities over the reals) whose arguments are constructed using predefined functions (such as real addition). An atom has the form p(t 1 , ..., t n ) where p is a predicate symbol and t i are terms. A literal is either an atom or a constraint. A goal is a finite sequence of literals. A rule is of the form H:-D where H, the head, is an atom and D, the body, is a possibly empty finite sequence of literals. A constraint logic program, or program, is a finite set of rules. Program rules are assumed to be normalized: only distinct variables are allowed to occur as arguments to atoms. Furthermore, we require that each rule defining a predicate p has identical sequence of variables x p1 , . . . x pn in the head atom, i.e., p(x p1 , . . . x pn ). We call this the base form of p. This is not restrictive since programs can always be normalized, and it will facilitate the presentation of the checking algorithms.
For concreteness, we rely on an abstract interpretation-based analysis algorithm in the style of the generic analyzer of [7] . This goal-dependent analysis algorithm, which we refer to as Analyze, given a program P and abstract domain D α , receives a set S α ∈ AAtom of Abstract Atoms (or call patterns) and constructs an analysis graph [5] for S α . The elements of S α are pairs of the form A : CP where A is a procedure descriptor and CP is an abstract substitution (i.e., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A expressed as CP ∈ D α .
1 Then, the analysis graph is an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of (possibly infinite) trees explored by the concrete execution of initial calls described by S α in P . The program analysis graph computed by Analyze(S α ) for P in D α can be implicitly represented by means of two data structures, the answer table and the dependency arc table (which are in fact the result of the analysis algorithm).
-Answer Table. Its entries correspond to the nodes in the analysis graph. They are of the form A : CP → AP, where A is always an atom in base form. They should be interpreted as "the answer pattern for calls to A satisfying precondition (or call pattern), CP, accomplishes postcondition (or answer pattern), AP." -Dependency Arc Table. The dependencies correspond to the arcs in the analysis graph. The intended meaning of a dependency A k : CP ⇒ B k,i : CP 1 associated to a program rule A k :-B k,1 , . . . , B k,n with i ∈ {1, ..n} is that the answer for A k : CP depends on the answer for B k,i : CP 1 , say AP 1 . Thus, if AP 1 changes with the update of some rule for B k,i then, the arc A k : CP ⇒ B k,i : CP 1 must be reprocessed in order to compute the new answer for A k : CP . In particular, the rule for A k has to be processed again starting from its body atom B k,i .
All the details and the formalization of the algorithm can be found in [7] . Certification in ACC [3] consists in using the complete set of entries stored in the answer table as certificate. Dependencies are not needed for certificate generation neither for non incremental checking though they will be needed later for incremental certificate checking.
Definition 1 (certificate [3] ). Let P ∈ P rog, D α ∈ ADom and S α ∈ AAtom. We define Cert ∈ ACert, the certificate for P and S α , as the set of entries stored in the answer table computed by Analyze(S α ) [7] for P in D α . Example 1. The next example shows a piece of a module which contains the following (normalized) program for the naive reversal of a list and uses an implementation of app with several base cases (e.g., added automatically by a partial evaluator [8] for efficiency purposes).
The description domain that we use in our examples is the definite Boolean functions [4] , denoted Def . The key idea in this description is to use implication to capture groundness dependencies. The reading of the function x → y is "if the program variable x is (becomes) ground, so is (does) program variable y." For example, the best description of the constraint
Groundness information is useful for many program optimizations and is also of great importance as a safety property, in order to verify that (C)LP programs are "well moded". The most general description does not provide information about any variable. The least general substitution ⊥ assigns the empty set of values to each variable.
For the analysis of our running example, we consider the calling pattern rev(X, Y) : , i.e., no entry information is provided on X nor Y. The analysis algorithm of [7] computes the following analysis graph (we have notably simplified the graph by not showing the constraints in order to facilitate the understanding):
The nodes in the graph are labeled with their call pattern (left superscript) and answer pattern (right superscript). When a node is already in the graph, it is not expanded any further and the currently available answer is used. This is illustrated in the graph with backwards arrows. In order to compute A 1 and A 2 , the analysis algorithm has to iterate twice over each of the dependencies D 1 , D 2 and D 3 in the graph until the fixpoint is reached. Intuitively, D 2 denotes that the answer for rev(X, Y) : may change if the answer for app(W, T, Y) : changes. In such a case, the second rule for rev must be processed again starting from atom app(W, T, Y) in order to recompute the fixpoint for rev(X, Y) : . D 1 and D 3 reflect the recursivity of rev(X, Y) : and app(W, T, Y) : , respectively, since they depend on themselves. The detailed steps performed by the algorithm can be found in [7] for the same program without the rules app 2 and app 3 . However these rules do not add any further information to the fixpoint computation and the steps performed there still apply for our example.
(State 0) The above graph is returned by Analyze by means of the following answers (nodes in the graph) and dependencies (arrows in the graph):
According to Definition 1, the certificate Cert for this example is composed of all entries in the answer table, i.e., A 1 and A 2 .
Incremental Certificate and Incremental Certifier
When a program is updated, it appears inefficient to generate, transmit, and check the full certificate Ext Cert for the updated program U P defined as U P = P ⊕Upd (P ). Our proposal is that it is possible to submit only the new program update Upd (P ) together with the incremental certificate Inc Cert, i.e., the difference of Ext Cert w.r.t. the original certificate, Cert. The bottom line is that the full fixpoint ExtCert differs from Cert in 1) the new fixpoint for each procedure directly affected by the updates which may be equal, more, less precise or incomparable depending on the kind of update (see Section 3), and 2) the update of other fixpoints possibly indirectly affected by the propagation of the effect of 1. However, there may be large parts of Cert which have not been affected by the changes and which do not need to be submitted nor checked again. In order to materialize this idea and achieve a compositional approach to incremental PCC, it is necessary that the consumer is able to reconstruct Ext Cert. To do this, the consumer has to store Cert and then properly extend it with the upcoming incremental certificate. Some storage vs time trade-offs are discussed in Sect. 8.
Definition 2 (incremental certificate).
In the conditions of Def. 1, we consider Upd (P ) ∈ U P rog, the update of P . Let Cert be the certificate for P and S α . Let Ext Cert be the certificate for P ⊕ Upd (P ) and S α . We define Inc Cert, the incremental certificate for Upd (P ) w.r.t. Cert, as the difference of certificates Ext Cert − Cert.
The difference of two certificates, Ext Cert − Cert, is defined as the set of entries B : CP B → AP B ∈ Ext Cert such that:
Intuitively, Inc Cert contains the subset of Ext Cert which corresponds to the extensions and modifications w.r.t. Cert. The first obvious advantage of the incremental approach is that Inc Cert can be much smaller than Ext Cert. On the other, the following example illustrates that updating a program can require the change in the analysis information previously computed for other procedures whose fixpoint is indirectly affected by the updates, although their definitions have not been directly changed.
Example 2. Consider the following new definition for predicate app which is a specialization of the previous app to concatenate lists of a's of the same length :
The update consists in deleting all rules for predicate app in Example 1, and replacing them by Napp 1 and Napp 2 . Upd (P ) is composed of the following information:
After running the (incremental) analysis algorithm in [7] , the following answer table and dependencies are computed (State 1):
Note that the analysis information has changed because the new definition of app allows inferring that all its arguments are ground upon success (NA 2 and NA 3 ). This change propagates to the answer of rev and allows inferring that, regardless of the calling pattern, both arguments of rev will be ground on the exit (NA 1 ). According to Definition 2, the incremental certificate Inc Cert contains NA 3 as it corresponds to a new calling pattern (by point 1) and contains also NA 1 and NA 2 since their answers have changed w.r.t. the ones in certificate of State 0 (by point 2).
The next definition introduces the notion of incremental certifier which, given the original certificate and program and an update of the program, returns the incremental certificate iff the safety policy can still be entailed from the extended certificate.
Definition 3 (incremental certifier). We define function Inc Certifier: P rog× UProg ×ADom ×AAtom ×AInt ×ACert → ACert which takes P ∈ P rog, Upd (P ) ∈ U P rog, D α ∈ ADom, S α ∈ AAtom, I α ∈ AInt, the certificate Cert ∈ ACert for P and S α . Let Ext Cert ∈ ACert be the full certificate for P ⊕ Upd (P ). Then, it returns Inc Cert, the incremental certificate for Upd (P ) w.r.t. Cert, iff Ext Cert I α .
Note that the above definition does not depend on the particular analysis algorithm used to generate Ext Cert. Incremental analysis algorithms (like the ones in [16, 7, 13, 15] ) are very well suited to do this task. They reanalyze only the part of the analysis graph affected by the increment. Thus, the time required to generate the certificate on the producer side can be reduced. Although this optimization on the producer side is always desirable, it is not as critical within the PCC scheme as the reduction of the package transmission time or the checking time, which take place on the consumer side and that we discuss in the next section.
Following the scheme in Figure 1 , the producer has started by retrieving P and Cert from disk. In its last phase, if certification for the new updated program has succeeded, then P and Cert will be superseded in disk by the updated program and the extended certificate, respectively.
A Checking Algorithm with Support for Incrementallity
In this section, we present a checking algorithm for full certificates which is instrumented with a Dependency Arc Table (DAT in the following). The DAT stores the dependencies between the atoms in the analysis graph (see Section 4). This structure is not required by non incremental checkers [3] but it is fundamental to support an incremental design. Intuitively, our abstract interpretation-based checking algorithm receives a certificate Cert and constructs a program analysis graph in a single iteration by assuming the fixpoint information in Cert. The original dependencies are not required because they can be reconstructed from the program. While the graph is being constructed, the obtained answers are stored in AT mem and compared with the corresponding fixpoints stored in Cert. If any of the computed answers is not consistent with the certificate (i.e., it is greater than the fixpoint), the certificate is considered invalid and the program is rejected. Otherwise, Cert gets checked. The checker returns the reconstructed answer table AT mem and the set of dependencies DAT mem which have been traversed. Algorithm 2 presents our checker which is parametric w.r.t. the abstract domain of interest. It is hence defined in terms of five abstract operations on a selected domain D α :
-Arestrict(CP, V ) performs the abstract restriction of a description CP to the set of variables in the set V , denoted vars(V ); -Aextend(CP, V ) extends the description CP to the variables in the set V ; -Aadd(C, CP) performs the abstract operation of conjoining the constraint C with the description CP; -Aconj(CP 1 , CP 2 ) performs the abstract conjunction of two descriptions; -Alub(CP 1 , CP 2 ) performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions.
Example 3. For the domain Def in Example 1, these abstract operations are defined as follows:
1: procedure checking(P, S, Cert,ATmem ,DATmem ) 2:
ATmem := ∅; DATmem := ∅; CP checked := ∅; 3:
for all A : CP ∈ S do process node(P, A : CP , Cert,ATmem ,DATmem ,CP checked ); 4:
return Valid; 5: procedure process node(P, A : CP , Cert,ATmem ,DATmem ,CP checked ) 6:
if (∃ a renaming σ s.t. σ(A : CP → AP ) in Cert) then 7:
add A : CP → σ −1 (AP ) to ATmem ; 8:
CP checked := CP checked ∪{A : CP }; 9:
Cert = Cert − {σ(A : CP → AP )}; 10:
else return Error; 11:
process set of rules(P, P |A, A : CP → σ −1 (AP ), Cert,ATmem ,DATmem , CP checked );
12: procedure process set of rules(P, R, A : CP → AP , Cert,ATmem ,DATmem ,CP checked ) 13:
CPa :=process rule(P ,A :
if (AP <> AP2) then return Error; 20: procedure process rule(P, A :
for all B k,i in the rule body i = j, ..., n k do 22:
CPa := process arc(P ,A :
CP b := CPa; CP R b := CP Ra; 25:
return CPa;
26: procedure process arc(P ,A :
process node (P ,B k,i : CP R b , Cert,ATmem , DATmem ,CP checked ); 31: 
where ∃ −V F represents ∃v 1 , . . . , v n F , where {v 1 , . . . , v n } = vars(F )−V , and is the least upper bound (lub) operation over the Def lattice. For instance,
Let us briefly explain the main functions of Algorithm 2.
1. Function checking(P ,S,Cert,AT mem ,DAT mem ), receives as parameters a program P , a set S of call patterns, the certificate Cert returned by Analyze, and two output variables AT mem and DAT mem which are initially empty (Line 2 of procedure checking). If it succeeds (L4), AT mem coincides with Cert, and DAT mem stores all dependencies generated during the checking process.
2. For each abstract atom A : CP ∈ S, checking calls process node (L3). This corresponds to the creation of a node in the analysis graph. Firstly, process node checks if there exists an answer for A : CP in Cert and stores it in AT mem (L6-7), removing it from Cert (L9). All calls to be checked must have its answer in Cert or the certificate is not valid and an error is issued (L10). It then proceeds to compute an answer for A : CP by processing all rules (L11) defining A in a depth-first, left-to-right fashion. 3. This is done in procedure process set of rules where the answers obtained for each rule in (L16) are lubbed (L18) with those stored in AT mem (the fixpoint) to check that they are less or equal than the fixpoint. Otherwise an error is issued (L19). 2 As notation, given the set of rules (or arcs) R, R| A denotes the set of rules (or arcs) in R applicable to atom A. 4. Each particular rule is handled by procedure process rule, which traverses the rule body (L21) and processes its corresponding atoms from left-to-right by using the answer obtained for B k,i : CP R b as calling pattern for processing B k,i+1 (L23). When all body atoms have been processed, the last answer is returned as final answer (L25). 5. Finally, procedure process arc creates the dependencies which correspond to the arcs in the analysis graph. Constraints are simply added to the current answer and no dependency is created for them (L27). As for each literal, procedure process arc looks up for an answer for it (L29) in AT mem (i.e., the answer copied from Cert). This avoids rechecking the same literal several times and ensures termination. If it does not exist, then a (recursive) call to process node (L30) computes a solution for the atom.
The main difference of the checking Algorithm 2 and the one in [3] is that our checker stores the dependencies in the analysis graph. This is done in procedure process arc (L33). During analysis, dependencies are used for achieving efficient implementations of fixed-point re-computations. Naturally, they have not been used in non incremental checking algorithms since re-computation should never happen when one assumes the fixpoint. In contrast, DAT mem will be fundamental for the design of our incremental checker, as we will see in the next section. We use the output parameter CP checked (L8) to store the calling patterns which have been already checked during the validation process. This will allow the incremental checking to avoid useless rechecking later. Also, we remove from the certificate the entries which are going to be checked (L9). In the incremental checking, this will be instrumental to detect the entries unrelated to the updates (see Section 7.1).
Example 4.
As an example, we illustrate the steps carried out by the checker to validate the rules app 1 and app 4 of Example 1 w.r.t. a certificate Cert composed of the entry A 2 . We take as call pattern app(X, Y, Z) : . Consider the call to procedure process node for app(X, Y, Z) : . The entry A 2 is added (L7) to AT mem (initially empty), and app(X, Y, Z) : is marked as checked (by inserting it in CP checked ) and removed from Cert. A call to process set of rules is generated for the call pattern at hand w.r.t. rules app 1 and app 4 (L11). Let us consider the processing of the two rules.
1. The call to process rule for app 1 (L16) executes process arc (L22) for each of the two constraints in the body. The final answer CP a ≡ X ∧ (Y ↔ Z) (L16) for app 1 is built up from the abstract conjunction (L32) between X (partial answer from first constraint) and Y ↔ Z (from second constraint). Since the least upper bound (L18) between CP a and the answer A 2 is A 2 , then no Error is issued (L19) and the first rule app 1 gets successfully checked. 2. As before, the call to process rule for app 4 executes process arc for the first two constraints and computes as (partial) solution
Since we are not in the last atom of the rule (L23), CP a is restricted to the variables in app(V, Y, W), giving as result CP R a ≡ . Now, the next call to process arc for the rightmost body atom app(V, Y, W) : computes as final solu-
, which is simplified to A 2 . The corresponding dependency is stored in the DAT. Thus, the call to process rule for app 4 computes as solution A 2 (L16), the same answer stored in Cert, and no Error is issued (L19).
Therefore, both rules have been successfully checked in one pass over them and the checker returns Valid. 2
In order to support Incrementallity, the final values of the data structures AT mem , DAT mem and P must be available after the end of the execution of the checker. Thus, we denote by AT persist , DAT persist and P persist the copy in persistent memory (i.e., in disk) of such structures.
Definition 4 (checker).
We define function checker:P rog × ACert × AAtom × ADom → boolean which takes a program P ∈ P rog and its certificate Cert ∈ ACert for S α ∈ AAtom in D α ∈ ADom and 1. It returns the result of checking(P, S α , Cert, AT mem , DAT mem ).
If it does not issue an
Error, then it stores in memory AT persist := AT mem , DAT persist := DAT mem and P persist := P .
Incremental Checking
In this section, we propose an incremental checking algorithm which deals with all possible updates over a program in a unified form. The basic idea is that the task performed by an incremental checker has to be optimized such that it only: a) rechecks the part of the abstraction for the procedures which have been directly affected by an update and, b) propagates and rechecks the indirect effect of these changes. In order to do this, we will take as starting point the checker in Algorithm 2. Its DAT will allow the incremental algorithm to propagate the changes and carry out the process in a single pass over the subgraph affected by the updates. Algorithm 3 presents our implementation of this intuition. The intuitive idea is that we start by removing all (possibly incorrect or inaccurate) information directly affected by the updates from the answer table and DAT (i.e., the information for the updated procedures) and, then, we check it from scratch against the answers provided in the incremental certificate. If the "direct" checking succeeds, we proceed to check the information indirectly affected by such changes in a similar way (i.e., delete the information for them from answer and DAT and recheck it from scratch). This iterative process successfully finishes when all direct and indirect affected information gets checked. Otherwise, an Error is issued.
1: procedure incremental checking(P ,Upd (P ),Inc Cert,ATmem ,DATmem ) 2:
Pmem := P ⊕ Upd (P ); 3:
update answer for all B : CPB ⇒ A : CP ∈ DATmem do 34:
if B : CPB ∈ CP checked ∪ CP tocheck then CP tocheck :=CP tocheck ∪{B : CPB };
Fig. 3. Incremental Checking Algorithm 3
The incremental checker is defined as follows: replace the procedure checking by the new procedure incremental checking in Algorithm 3 and use the remaining procedures defined in Algorithm 2. Essentially, the additional tasks that an incremental checker has to perform w.r.t. the non incremental one in Algorithm 2 are the following:
1. Retrieve stored data. After checking the original package, the structures AT persist , DAT persist and the program P persist have been stored in persistent memory (see Definition 4). Our checker retrieves such stored data and initializes, respectively, the parameters AT mem , DAT mem and P with them. 2. Update program and answer table. Prior to proceeding with the proper checking, the incoming updates Upd (P ) are applied (by means of the operator ⊕) to P in order to generate P mem (L2). Also, the procedure update answer table updates the answer table by updating the answers for those call patterns in AT mem which have a different answer in Inc Cert (L10-12). The new entries not yet present in AT mem will be asserted in it upon request, as it is done in the usual checking process (L7 of Algorithm 2). 3. Initialize call patterns to check. The procedure call patterns to check initializes the set CP tocheck with those call patterns with an entry in AT mem which correspond to a rule directly affected by an update (L15-16). During the execution of the checker, the set CP tocheck will be dynamically extended to include the additional call patterns whose checking is indirectly affected by the propagation of changes (L34). 4. Check affected procedures. Procedure check affected entries is encharged of launching the checking of all procedures affected by the updates, i.e., the call patterns in CP tocheck − CP checked . As mentioned in Section 4, the set CP checked is used to avoid rechecking the same call pattern more than once, if it appears several times in the analysis subgraph to be checked. Three actions are taken in order to check a call pattern:
3
-remove its analysis information (L20), -proceed to check it by calling process node of Algorithm 2 (L26) and, -propagate the effects of type b) if needed (L28). We only propagate effects if the answer provided in Inc Cert for the call pattern at hand is different from that originally stored in AT persist (L25). As a technical detail, in L23, we add to Inc Cert the information which, although has not changed w.r.t. AT mem , needs to be checked and, therefore, it must be available in Inc Cert (or process node would issue an error in L10 of Algorithm 2). 5. Remove previous analysis information. Before proceeding with the checking, we need to get rid of previous (possibly incorrect or inaccurate) analysis information. Procedure remove previous info eliminates the entry to be checked from AT mem (L30) and all its dependencies from DAT mem (L31). 6. Propagate effects. After processing the updated rules, the procedure propagate effects introduces in the set CP tocheck (L34) the calling patterns whose answer depends on the updated one, i.e., those which are indirectly affected by the updates. Their checking will be later required in L18. 7. Store data. Upon return, the checker has to store the computed AT mem , DAT mem and P mem , respectively, in AT persist , DAT persist , and P persist for achieving a compositional design of our incremental approach.
Definition 5 (incremental checker).
We define function Incr Checker: UProg ×ACert× → boolean which takes Upd (P ) ∈ U P rog and its incremental certificate Inc Cert ∈ ACert and 1. It retrieves from memory AT mem := AT persist , DAT mem := DAT persist and P := P persist . 2. It returns the result of incremental checking(P, Upd (P ), Inc Cert, AT mem , DAT mem ) for P . 3. If it does not issue an Error, then it stores AT persist := AT mem , DAT persist := DAT mem and P persist := P mem .
An important point to note is that the safety policy has to be tested w.r.t. the answer table for the extended program. Therefore, the checker has reconstructed, from Inc Cert, the answer table returned by Analyze for the extended program, Ext Cert, in order to test for adherence to the safety policy -Equation (4), i.e., AT persist ≡ Ext Cert. It should be noted that the design of our incremental checking algorithm is notably different from the design of an incremental analyzer (like the ones in [7, 13] ). In particular, the treatment of deletions and arbitrary changes is completely different. In our case, we can take advantage of the information provided in the certificate in order to avoid the need to compute the strongly connected components (see [7] ). This was necessary in the analyzer in order to ensure the correctness of the incremental algorithm. We additionally have had to include the detection of no valid certificates. Unlike [7, 13] , we have integrated in a single algorithm all incremental updates over a program in a seamless way. In Section 7.3, we will identify the particular optimizations of our unified algorithm for certain types of updates.
Our first example is intended to illustrate a situation in which the task performed by the incremental checker is optimized such that it only checks a part of the analysis graph.
Example 5. Consider the deletion of rules app 2 and app 3 of Example 1. The analysis algorithm of [7] returns the same state (State 0) since the eliminated rules do not affect the fixpoint result, i.e., they do not add any further information. Thus, the incremental certificate Inc Cert associated to such an update is empty. The checking algorithm proceeds as follows. Initially, AT mem and DAT mem are initialized with the values in State 0. P mem is composed of the rules rev 1 , rev 2 , app 1 and app 4 . Procedure update answer table (L3) does not modify AT mem . The execution of procedure call patterns to check (L4) adds E 1 ≡ app(X, Y, Z) : to CP tocheck . Procedure check affected entries selects E 1 from CP tocheck . The next call to remove previous info (L20) removes A 2 from AT mem and D 3 from DAT mem . It then inserts A 2 in Inc Cert. The variable "propagate" takes the value false. We now jump to the non incremental checking with a call to procedure process node (L26). This process corresponds exactly to the checking illustrated in Example 4. Upon return from process node, since the variable "propagate" is false, no effects have to be propagated.
The important point to note is that the incremental checker has not had to recheck the rules for rev since its answer is not affected by the deletion. Once Inc Cert has been validated, the consumer mems the answer table AT mem , the dependency arc table DAT mem (which are those of State 0) and the program P mem in disk. 2
Our second example is intended to show how to propagate the effect of a change to the part of the analysis graph affected by such update.
Example 6. Let us illustrate the checking process carried out to validate the update proposed in Example 2 with an incremental certificate, Inc Cert, which contains the entries NA 1 , NA 2 and NA 3 . The incremental checker retrieves State 0 from disk. Next, procedure update answer table returns as new AT mem the entries NA 1 and NA 2 which replace the old entries A 1 and A 2 , respectively. Then, the set CP tocheck is initialized with E 1 ≡ app(X, Y, Z) : . Procedure check affected entries first executes remove previous info, which eliminates E 1 from AT mem and dependency D 3 from DAT mem . Moreover, the variable "propagate" is initialized to true. This annotates that effects have to be propagated later. The execution of process node for E 1 succeeds and adds the dependency D 3 to DAT mem and the set CP checked is returned with E 1 marked as checked. Upon return, since the variable "propagate" is true, a call to propagate effects is generated which forces the checking of rev. After inspecting D 2 and D 3 (the two dependencies for E 1 ), only the entry E 2 ≡ rev(X, Y) : is added to CP tocheck . The dependency for D 3 will not be checked because E 1 has been already processed (hence, it belongs to CP checked ). Now, procedure check affected entries takes E 2 from CP tocheck , and similarly to the previous case, successfully executes process node, and replaces D 2 by ND 2 . During the checking of rule rev 2 , a new call to process node is generated for E 3 ≡ app(X , Y, Z) : X which introduces E 3 in CP checked , and replaces the dependency D 3 in DAT mem by the new one ND 3 of Example 2. Upon return, since the variable "propagate" is true, a call to propagate effects is generated from it. But the affected dependency D 1 is not processed because E 1 was processed already and belongs to CP checked .
The conclusion is that a single pass has been performed on the three provided entries in order to validate the certificate.
2
The correctness of the checking algorithm amounts to saying that, if our checker does not issue an error, then it returns as computed answer table the extended certificate for the updated program. Moreover, we ensure that it does not iterate during the reconstruction of any answer.
Theorem 1 (correctness). Let P ∈ P rog, Upd (P ) ∈ UProg, D α ∈ ADom and S α ∈ AAtom. Consider:
-Cert: the certificate for P and S α . -Ext Cert: the certificate for P ⊕ Upd (P ) and S α . -Inc Cert: the incremental certificate for Upd (P ) w.r.t. Cert.
If Incr Checker(Upd (P ), Inc Cert) does not issue an Error, then the validation of Inc Cert is done in a single pass over Inc Cert and:
where AT mem and DAT mem are, respectively, the answer table and DAT returned by
The proof of this theorem can be found in the appendix.
Entries unrelated to updates
The incremental setting has to take into account a new type of Error which does not occur in non incremental PCC. This corresponds to a situation in which the producer includes in the incremental certificate certain entries for calling patterns which are unrelated to the updates, i.e., they do not correspond to the updated procedures nor to the propagation of their effects. However, they are related with procedures stored in P persist in some previous iteration. These entries may have been included in the certificate by the producer in order to provide a new, more precise fixpoint for some procedure which, for instance, has been obtained by using a higher quality analyzer. In principle, this information may seem not useful as the previous fixpoint in AT persist was already valid to entail the safety policy. Nevertheless, it could be the case that the safety policy is later changed and one needs the more precise information received in this incremental certificate in order to imply such policy. Also, this accuracy could be required in a later modification.
Since the procedures of Algorithm 3 described so far only check the new updates and their demanded entries, we check in a posterior phase that the entries unrelated to the updates are valid fixpoints or, otherwise, issue an error. This is done by the following procedure unrelated entries which is executed from L7 in Algorithm 3.
procedure unrelated entries(Pmem , Inc Cert,ATmem ,DATmem ,CP tocheck ,CP checked ) CP tocheck := ∅; for all A : CP ∈ Inc Cert do CP tocheck := CP tocheck ∪ {A : CP }; check affected entries (Pmem ,Inc Cert, ATmem , DATmem ,CP tocheck ,CP checked )
Note that we can easily identify the entries unrelated to the updates because they are the only ones which remain in Inc Cert after having checked the affected procedures. This happens because in L9 of Algorithm 2 we remove from Inc Cert those entries which are being checked.
By checking unrelated answers as well, we can now ensure that any invalid fixpoint will be rejected by the consumer. The proof can be found in [1] .
Theorem 2. In the conditions of Theorem 1, if an answer in
It should be noted that in order to ensure that all valid certificates get checked with the incremental checker, we have to provide all the information required by the checker within the incremental certificate. This can be ensured by using an incremental analyzer which uses the same graph traversal strategy than the checker in order to generate the incremental certificates. More details can be found in the appendix.
Cleaning up the Certificate
Those entries for A : CP in AT mem (and which are not in S) corresponding to deleted rules can be removed from the final answer table. We can identify them by exploring the new dependencies. If there is no entry which depends on it, then we can remove such entry. This is a rather standard procedure performed in analysis algorithms to eliminate useless entries.
procedure remove useless entries(ATmem ,DATmem ) for all A : CP ∈ ATmem and A : CP ∈ S do if ∃B : CPB ⇒ A : CP ∈ DATmem then remove A : CP from ATmem
As an example, consider the following program and S = {p(X, Y) : }:
By using the analysis algorithm in [7] , we have that Cert is made up of
The checker stores in disk memory AT persist ≡ Cert and DAT persist is:
Suppose that the unique rule for h is deleted and the unique rule for p is replaced by the new one:
The producer sends to the consumer such an update along with Inc Cert={p(X, Y) : → X}. Then Incr Checker, starting from AT persist and DAT persist , rechecks p(X, Y) : , removing its old answer from AT mem and its dependencies from DAT mem . The checking process introduces in AT mem the new answer for p, and in DAT mem only the dependency related to q. Now, procedure remove useless entries compares AT mem with the new computed dependency. Since h does not belong to S and does not occur in the right hand side of the dependency, then the entry h(Y) : → Y is removed from AT mem . The purpose of the above procedure is clearly to reduce the size of the persistent certificate. Its execution can be switched off when the higher priority is to reduce the checking time w.r.t. optimize storage resources.
Optimizations to the generic algorithm
Our generic incremental checking algorithm admits an optimization which avoids rechecking some useless call patterns in certain cases. When an entry A : CP → AP in the new certificate is affected by the update of B : CP B , the call pattern A : CP is fully checked with a call to process node which traverses all rules for A from their leftmost positions. This is done because if one considers any possible update, the old answer for A : CP → AP may be inaccurate in the case of deletion or arbitrary change when AP AP . Therefore, we cannot assume AP and the checking for A : CP has to delete all its previous information and start from scratch.
However, when we know that the old answer AP is lesser than AP , i.e., AP AP , we can process only the part of the subgraph associated to checking A : CP which depends on the update of B : CP B . This always happens in the addition of predicates and it can eventually happen in the deletion and arbitrary changes (see Section 3). We can easily find out this point in the algorithm through the dependency A k : CP ⇒ B k,i : CP B . In particular, we will replace in such a case the call to process node for A : CP by a call to process rule for the rule for A k starting from its body atom B k,i . As an example, consider the program given in Example 5, where Inc Cert is empty because, after updating the program, all entries have remained the same. In such a case, the only call pattern app(X, Y, Z) : affected by the update does not need to be checked, since its answer is still correctly described by the remaining rules.
The implementation of this idea in the algorithm, although conceptually clear, gets technically more involved due to the need of ensuring that the remaining arcs from A k to its body atoms to the right of B k,i are checked only once. For the case of the addition of rules only, an optimized incremental checker can be found in [2] . For an arbitrary update, we do not integrate the same optimization here by lack of space (but can be found in our technical report [1] ).
Conclusions
Our approach to incremental ACC aims at reducing the size of certificates and the checking time when a supplier provides an untrusted update of a (previously) validated package. Essentially, when a program is subject to an update, the incremental certificate we propose contains only the difference between the original certificate for the initial program and the new certificate for the updated one. Checking time is reduced by traversing only those parts of the abstraction which are affected by the changes rather than the whole abstraction. An important point to note is that our incremental approach requires the original certificate and the dependency arc table to be stored by the consumer side for upcoming updates. The appropriateness of using the incremental approach will therefore depend on the particular features of the consumer system and the frequency of software updates. In general, our approach seems to be more suitable when the consumer prefers to minimize as much as possible the waiting time for receiving and validating the certificate while storage requirements are not scarce. We believe that, in everyday practice, time-consuming safety tests would be avoided by many users, while they would probably accept to store the safety certificate and dependencies associated to the package. Nevertheless, there can sometimes be situations where storage resources can be very limited, while runtime resources for performing upcoming checkings could still be sufficient. We are now in the process of extending the ACC implementation already available in the CiaoPP system to support incrementallity. Our preliminary results in certificate reduction are very promising. We expect optimizations in the checking time similar to those achieved in the case of incremental analysis (see, e.g., [7] ).
A Correctness of the Incremental Checking
Definition 6. Let P ∈ P rog, Upd (P ) ∈ UProg, D α ∈ ADom and S α ∈ AAtom. Consider:
We define the set of unchanged entries in Ext Cert as:
Note that when a program is updated, it is possible that there exists entries in Cert not occurring in Ext Cert, as shown in Section 7.1. On the other hand, it holds trivially that unchanged (Ext Cert) is the set of entries in Ext Cert which preserve their answers in Cert after an update of the original program.
As notation, given any dependency arc table DAT and call pattern A : CP , we define the set dependencies(DAT , A : CP ) as the set of all dependencies in DAT of the form A : CP ⇒ B : CP B .
Definition 7. Let P ∈ P rog, Upd (P ) ∈ UProg, D α ∈ ADom and S α ∈ AAtom. Consider:
Let DAT mem be the dependency arc table computed by the call checking(P ⊕Upd (P ),S, Ext Cert, AT mem ,DAT mem ). We say that an entry A : CP ∈ Ext Cert is safe if:
-A : CP ∈ unchanged (Ext Cert), i.e, A : CP ∈ Cert and A : CP ∈ Inc Cert. -A has not an entry in Upd (P ).
-For all dependency A : CP ⇒ B : CP B ∈ dependencies(DAT mem , A : CP ), B : CP B ∈ unchanged (Ext Cert).
The following proposition ensures that the checking process for P w.r.t. Cert behaves similarly to that for P ⊕ Upd (P ) w.r.t. Ext Cert, for those call patterns being safe.
Proposition 1. Let P ∈ P rog, Upd (P ) ∈ UProg, D α ∈ ADom and S α ∈ AAtom. Consider:
-Cert: the certificate for P and S α .
-Ext Cert: the certificate for P ⊕ Upd (P ) and S α .
-Inc Cert: the incremental certificate for Upd (P ) w.r.t. Cert.
Consider the calls:
Then, for all A : CP ∈ Ext Cert being safe, an for all rule r ≡ A :-B 1 , . . . , B n ∈ P for A, the calls: :-B 1 , . . . , B n ∈ P be a rule for A. Calls (O r ) and (E r ) require n calls to procedure process arc (L22 of Algorithm 2) in order to compute the final solution. Let us prove that, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the k-th call to process arc for (O r ) and (E r ) is done with the same parameters Base case (k = 1). Trivially, both calls verify (*). We distinguish two cases:
1. B 1 is a constraint. Then, both calls to process arc computes the same solution (L27). 2. B 1 is an atom. Since A : CP is safe, then B 1 : CPR 1 ∈ unchanged (Ext Cert).
But then, Definition 6 ensures that B and DAT E mem respectively (L33). Inductive case (1 ≤ k < n). The inductive hypothesis is that the result holds for the first 1 ≤ k < n calls to function process arc. Hence, the k+1 call to process arc verifies trivially (*). Reasoning similarly to the base case, and considering that B k+1 : CPR k +1 ∈ unchanged (Ext Cert), it holds that both calls to process arc computes the same answer and store the same dependencies for A.
Hence, since all calls to process arc for (O r ) and (E r ) compute the same solution and store the same dependencies for A, then trivially, the calls (O) and (E) also compute the same solution and store the same dependencies for A. 2
Note that the above proposition ensures that the calls (O) and (E) behave similarly in presence of safe call patterns. Thus, safe call patterns does not require to be rechecked when a program is updated.
In the following, we will call original checking to the checking process executed for P w.r.t. Cert, and extended checking to the checking process executed for P ⊕Upd (P ) w.r.t. Ext Cert. We will denote by AT Proposition 2. Let P ∈ P rog, Upd (P ) ∈ UProg, D α ∈ ADom and S α ∈ AAtom. Consider:
-Ext Cert: the certificate for P ⊕ Upd (P ) and S α . -Inc Cert: the incremental certificate for Upd (P ) w.r.t. Cert.
If incremental checking(P ,Upd (P ),Inc Cert, AT mem , DAT mem ), where AT mem ≡ Cert ≡ AT O mem , and DAT mem ≡ DAT O mem , does not issue an Error then, for all non safe A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Ext Cert, it holds that A 0 : CP 0 ∈ CP checked .
Proof. By Definition 7, if A 0 : CP 0 is not safe, then A 0 : CP 0 verifies at least one of the following conditions:
On the other hand, note that A 0 : CP 0 only may belong to CP checked iff A 0 : CP 0 belonged previouly to the set CP tocheck . The corresponding call to process node (L26 of Algorithm 3) for A 0 : CP 0 will introduce A 0 : CP 0 in CP checked (L8 of Algorithm 2) . Let us analyze all the above cases:
• (Case B) If A 0 has an entry in Upd (P ) then, since A 0 : CP 0 ∈ AT mem , then A 0 : CP 0 was initially introduced in CP tocheck (L16 in Algorithm 3) by procedure calls patterns to check. Hence, a call to process node (L26) was generated, introducing A 0 : CP 0 in CP checked (L8 in Algorithm 2).
Suppose that A 0 has no entries in Upd (P ). Since A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert ∩ Inc Cert, then there exists at least a rule r ∈ P for A 0 such that the calls to process rule for r in the original and the extended checking process, computed a different answer. Furthermore, at least one of such rules r 0 verifies that there exists at least an atom B j0 in r 0 such that:
-The original and extended checking process generated a call to process arc for B j0 : CPR j0 and they computed different answers.
Note that if r 0 does not exist, then A 0 : CP 0 only could have changed its answer (from the original to the extended checking) because of an update of its rules. But we are assuming that A 0 has no entries in Upd (P ). Now, we distinguish two cases:
-If B j0 has an entry in Upd (P ) then, since B j0 ∈ AT mem , it holds that B j0 :
CPR j0 was initially introduced in CP tocheck (L16 in Algorithm 3) by procedure calls patterns to check. But B j0 : CPR j0 ∈ Inc Cert, then procedure check affected entries (L25) initializes variable propagate to true, calling to procedure propagate effects (L28) after calling to process node (L26) for B j0 : CPR j0 . But A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert∩Ext Cert and A 0 has no entries in Upd (P ), then the dependency
has not an entry in Upd (P ), then reasoning similarly, there exists a rule r 1 ∈ P and an atom B j1 in r 1 such that, the original and extended checking process generated a call to process arc for B j1 : CPR j1 but computed different answers. On the other hand, B j1 : CPR j1 ∈ Cert ∩ Inc Cert and it is different from A 0 : CP 0 and B j0 : CPR j0 .
• If B j1 has an entry in Upd (P ), then B j1 : CPR j1 was initially introduced in CP tocheck . But B j0 : CPR j0 ⇒ B j1 : CPR j1 ∈ DAT mem . Hence, as in the above case, propagate effects introduces B j0 : CPR j0 in CP tocheck (unless B j0 : CPR j0 ∈ CP checked ). But then, check affected entries processes B j0 : CPR j0 and propagates its effects. Since the dependency A 0 : CP 0 ⇒ B j0 : CPR j0 ∈ DAT mem , then, again progagate effects introduces A 0 : CP 0 in CP tocheck (unless A 0 : CP 0 ∈ CP checked ). Thus, finally A 0 : CP 0 ∈ CP checked .
• If B j1 has no an entry in Upd (P ), then reasoning similarly and considering that the process is finite, we obtain a sequence of arcs:
such that B ji : CPR ji ∈ Cert ∩ Inc Cert, 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 and B j k+1 has an entry in Upd (P ). Thus, B j k+1 : CPR j k +1 ∈ CP checked , and propagating dependencies (by procedure propagate effects), we obtain that A 0 : CP 0 ∈ CP checked .
• (Case A) If A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert, then A 0 : CP 0 comes from the checking of some rule, and the dependency:
We distinguish two cases:
-If B 1 : CP 1 ∈ Cert then, the rule associated to the dependency has necessarily the form:
r ≡ B 1 :-. . . , A, . . . , A 0 , . . . and the original and extended checking process verify that a call to process arc for A : CP ∈ Cert ∩ Inc Cert was generated computing different answers for A : CP . But then, A : CP corresponds to (case B) previously proved, and hence A : CP ∈ CP checked . Then propagate effects introduces B 1 : CP 1 in CP tocheck . But then, a call process node for B 1 : CP 1 is generated during the incremental checking, which forces the checking of rule r. Since A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert, then a call to process node for A 0 : CP 0 is generated (L30 in Algorithm 2), introducing A 0 : CP 0 in CP checked (L8). Note that it is possible that A 0 : CP 0 ∈ AT mem , before processing r. But in particular, since A 0 : CP 0 did not initially belong to AT mem , this means that A 0 : CP 0 necessarily suffered a previous call to process node, i.e., A 0 : such that B i : CP i ∈ Cert, 1 ≤ i < n, B n : CP n ∈ Cert. Then, the rule associated to the dependency r n−1 has necessarily the form:
r ≡ B n :-. . . , A, . . . , B n−1 , . . . and its original and extended checking process verify that a call to process arc for A : CP ∈ Cert ∩ Inc Cert was generated computing different answers for A : CP . But then, A : CP corresponds to (case B) previously proved, and hence A : CP ∈ CP checked . Reasoning similarly to the above case, we obtain that B i : CP i ∈ CP checked , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and thus A 0 : CP 0 ∈ CP checked .
• (Case C) A 0 has an entry in Upd (P ). We have two possibilities.
-If A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert, then A 0 : CP 0 ∈ AT mem . Hence, procedure call patterns to check introduces A 0 : CP 0 in CP tocheck . Thus, finally A 0 : CP 0 will belong to CP checked (after the corresponding call to process node for A 0 : CP 0 ). -If A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert, then we are in (case A). Hence, the execution of procedure incremental checking will introduce A 0 : CP 0 in CP checked .
• (Case D) There exists a dependency A 0 : CP 0 ⇒ B : CP B ∈ DAT E mem such that B : CP B ∈ unchanged (Ext Cert). We distinguish several possibilities:
-If A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert, then the result holds by (case A).
-If A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Cert, then:
• If A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Inc Cert, then the result holds by (case B).
• If A 0 : CP 0 ∈ Inc Cert, then: * If B : CP B ∈ Cert, then by (case A), B : CP B ∈ CP checked . Hence, the incremental checking generates a call to process node for B : CP B and also to propagate effects. The last call introduces A 0 : CP 0 in CP tocheck (if A 0 : CP 0 was not previously introduced). * If B : CP B ∈ Cert ∩ Inc Cert. Then, by (case B), B : CP B ∈ CP checked , and reasoning as in the above case, it holds finally that A 0 : CP 0 ∈ CP checked . 2 Theorem 1 (correctness) Let P ∈ P rog, Upd (P ) ∈ UProg, D α ∈ ADom and S α ∈ AAtom. Consider:
where AT mem and DAT mem are, respectively, the answer table and DAT returned by checking(P ⊕ Upd (p), S α , Ext Cert, AT mem , DAT mem ).
Proof. First note that the validation of Inc Cert is done in one pass because of the use of the sets CP tocheck and CP checked . Firstly CP tocheck stores those call patterns A : CP in Cert such that A has suffered some modification of its rules. The incremental checking only adds call patterns to CP tocheck in procedure propagate effects but firstly ensuring that such call patterns were not previously checked L34 (they do not belong to the set CP checked ).
Incr Checker(Upd (P ), Inc Cert) retrieves from memory AT persist ≡ Cert ≡ AT
O mem
and DAT persist ≡ DAT O mem , and initializes AT mem and DAT mem to such values, respectively, when calling to procedure incremental checking(P, Upd (P ), Inc Cert, AT mem , DAT mem ). For all A : CP ∈ Ext Cert, A : CP is of one of the following forms:
-A : CP is safe. Then A : CP ∈ Cert ∩ Ext Cert and A : CP ∈ Inc Cert. Hence, A : CP → AP ∈ AT mem ∩ Ext Cert. By Definition 7, if A : CP is safe, then A : CP ∈ CP checked . Note that this condition holds since A has no entries in Upd (P ) (then calls patterns to check can not add A : CP to CP tocheck ), and all its dependencies contains atoms B : CP B not belonging to Inc Cert (i.e., if B : CP B is checked, variable propagate is always false, and no call to propagate effects is generated). From Proposition 1, DAT O mem contains the same dependencies for A : CP than DAT E mem . But, since A : CP ∈ CP checked , DAT mem contains also the same dependencies for A : CP than DAT O mem . Also Proposition 1 ensures that safe call patterns do not require to be checked after an update of a program, since the full and the extended checking process compute the same solutions. Hence the result holds for safe call patterns.
-If A : CP is not safe. First note that procedure update answer table (L3) updates AT mem with the information stored in Inc Cert. This ensures that all fixpoints used in the incremental checking process will be correct, i.e., will be the same those used by the extended checking. On the other hand, from Proposition 2, it holds that after executing procedure incremental checking, A : CP ∈ CP checked . This means that a call to process node is generated for all non safe call patterns A : CP , and their fixpoints are introduced in AT mem from Inc Cert. But, before calling to process node for A : CP , the procedure remove previous info (L20) removes the entry for A : CP from AT mem and the corresponding dependencies from DAT mem . If A : CP ∈ Inc Cert (case in which A : CP has the same fixpoint in the extended and original checking process but its rules has been modified), then the fixpoint stored in AT mem is introduced in Inc Cert (L23) in order to avoid an Error in procedure process node. Trivially, the incremental checking and the extended checking compute the same dependencies for non safe call patterns, and considering now that after updating AT mem , it holds that AT mem ∪ Inc Cert = Ext Cert, then the result holds trivially. 2
B Security of the Incremental Checking
Theorem 2 In the conditions of Theorem 1, if an answer in Inc Cert is not a Valid fixpoint, then Incr Checker(Upd (P ), Inc Cert) issues an Error.
Proof. Assume that A : CP → AP ∈ Inc Cert but AP is not a fixpoint for A : CP . If A has an entry in Upd (P ), then the call to process node for A : CP will issue an Error when processing some of its rules (from the correctness Algorithm 2 [3] ). If all rules for A remain the same but A : CP is introduced in CP tocheck because of the propagation of some change (procedure propagate effects), then again the corresponding call to process node will issue an Error. If none of the both previous cases occurs, procedure unrelated entries (L7) will introduce A : CP in CP tocheck , calling to procedure check affected entries, which will detect the Error when calling to process node. 2
